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Abstract 
The successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have resulted in significant tariff 
reductions in many countries.  Malaysia is no exception as the applied most-favoured-nation 
tariff rate in her agricultural sector in 2009 is relatively low, averaging at 2.8 percent.  
Despite the reduction in tariff barrier, the incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the sector 
over the 1978 – 2007 period has generally increased even though efforts at dismantling 
these barriers have long been initiated.  Thus, the paper seeks to identify factors that 
influence the level of NTBs in the agricultural sector.  Using the autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration, we find imports, average tariff, sectoral 
competitiveness level, and employment growth to be significant determinants of NTBs in the 
agricultural sector.  The findings provide a greater understanding of the reasons behind 
agricultural trade protectionism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have resulted in relatively low tariff 
levels in both developed and developing countries.  With this low tariff environment, the role 
of non-tariff barriers, henceforth NTBs, as a protectionist and regulatory trade policy tool has 
become more evident.  For instance, Fugazza and Maur (2006) report that the average 
number of tariff lines per country that is subjected to any type of NTB in 2004 had increased 
to 5,620 from 1,880 in 1994.  More recently, the number of new trade-related measures 
notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has also increased by as many as 119 
(ICTSD, 2009).  In addition, many low and middle-income countries seem to have relatively 
high ad valorem equivalent of core NTBs.  Malaysia has also been found to have high level 
of NTBs in her agricultural sector (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006)1. NTBs are generally 
regarded as restrictions to trade other than the traditional customs duties.  Specifically, they 
are a form of measures other than tariff that hampers the importation of goods directly into a 
country and are considered discriminatory, as they do not apply equally to domestic 
production or distribution (Hillman, as cited in Beghin and Bureau, 2001: 132).  Thus, the 
rise in NTBs as a protectionist tool is a cause for concern.  This is because the gains from 
trade, due to lower tariffs may be curtailed by the presence of NTBs. Furthermore, relative to 
tariff, these barriers lead to greater welfare loss in terms of trade deterioration effect (Ching, 
Wong, and Zhang, 2004). They also increase the operating costs of firms and hamper firms’ 
access to markets. As NTBs are potentially import-reducing and could adversely affect the 
trade liberalization gains that are achieved via tariff reductions, increased efforts to 
dismantle these barriers have been undertaken by the WTO and the many preferential trade 
groupings.  Despite these efforts, the removal of such barriers is not easy due to the limited 
knowledge about NTBs.  This limitation stems from the fact that there is a myriad of non-
tariff related measures that may or may not be obstacles to trade.  There is also insufficient                                                         
1 Kee et al. (2006) have measured the manufacturing and agricultural trade protection levels for 
various developed and developing economies, one of which is Malaysia.  
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data recording the presence of NTBs.  Due to this, there is a lack of empirical research 
pertaining to NTBs especially in developing countries.  Moreover, there are several 
shortcomings in the methods used to quantify NTBs.   
 
On the above premise, it is imperative that the incidence of NTBs in Malaysia’s agricultural 
sector is explored.  This would allow us to identify the types of NTBs imposed on imports.  
There is also a need to understand why such barriers exist despite the calls for their 
elimination.  Thus, the objective of the paper is twofold. First, it seeks to identify imports that 
are subjected to NTBs in the country’s agricultural sector.  Second, it attempts to determine 
the factors that influence the level of NTBs in the sector.  Findings from the study would 
provide a better picture of the prevalence of NTBs in the country’s agricultural sector.  This 
knowledge would assist the government in designing appropriate trade policy and in helping 
agricultural producers face the impending removal of NTBs due to the advent of 
globalization.The paper is organized as follows: The next section briefly discusses the 
incidence of NTBs in the country’s agricultural sector to be followed by Section 3 that 
discusses the current state of knowledge with regard to the determinants of NTBs. Section 4 
provides the theoretical basis for the determinants of NTBs.  Meanwhile, Section 5 focuses 
on the empirical model and data used in the study.  Section 6 presents the findings while 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. NTBs IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
 
Malaysia’s imports that are imposed with non-tariff measures are classified into four different 
schedules of the Customs (Prohibition of Import) Order of the Royal Malaysian Customs. 
The first schedule contains a list of goods whose imports are completely banned due to 
national, religious, security, and health reasons.  The second schedule covers goods whose 
imports are allowed if accompanied with import licenses.  These goods are mainly controlled 
for health, sanitary, security, environmental protection or intellectual property reasons.  The 
third schedule lists goods that may not be imported except with import licenses due to 
protective reasons.  The fourth schedule is specific for products whose imports are allowed 
only if certain requirements are met.  For example, imports are permitted only when 
accompanied with import permits issued by certain departments or after obtaining specific 
certifications.  According to Alavi (1996: 60), the objectives of the first and fourth schedules 
are non-protective whereas those of the second and third are protective.  The discussion of 
the incidence of NTBs in the paper only includes those in the second, third and fourth 
schedules. Agricultural goods listed in the second schedule requiring import licenses from as 
early as 1978 are star anise, rice, eggs, poultry, plants, fruits, soil and pests, sugar, and 
wood in the rough.  In the 1980s, more goods were brought into the schedule such as beef, 
mutton, uncooked pasta, edible products of animal origins, un-worked diamonds and several 
mineral products2.  In 1993, the import license requirement was imposed on un-
manufactured tobacco and tobacco refuse.  In general, Malaysia is perceived to impose 
hefty control on un-manufactured tobacco imports.  The U.S. Department of State raised 
concern that this measure has affected the U.S. cigarette manufacturers that had to 
purchase the lower quality local tobacco (U.S. Department of State, 1994). The licensing 
requirement imposed on the imports of sugar and food is also seen as a trade restricting 
measure. 
                                                         
2 Examples of the mineral products are barytes, tin ores, slags and concentrates, natural sands, 
vermiculite, perlite, chlorites, kieserite, epsomite, earth colors, natural micaceous inoxides and others. 
These items, including un-worked diamonds from the stones product group are classified as 
agricultural products as they fall within the SITC groups of  0, 1, 2 and 4 based on Bora, Kuwahara 
and Laird (2002) classification.  
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In 1996, some of the products from the second schedule were shifted into the fourth 
schedule whereby imports were allowed only if specific criteria were met. These products 
were rice, poultry, eggs, beef and mutton.  The imports of poultry, eggs and egg products, 
beef, and mutton require import permit which are only issued after the plants have been 
inspected by the country’s Department of Veterinary Services.  The relevant Malaysian 
authority seldom conducts the re-inspection of plants or slaughterhouses. This is perceived 
as a trade barrier as it prevents the Australian and the U.S. companies from re-applying for 
certification or rectifying problems found in the initial inspection (Warr, Rodriguez, and 
Penm, 2008).  Meanwhile, the import of rice does not only require a license but must also be 
imported through BERNAS3.  This monopoly of rice import by BERNAS is viewed as a 
barrier too as it has brought certain disadvantage to the U.S. rice suppliers.  
 
Meanwhile, imports listed in the third schedule are imposed with licensing requirements so 
that temporary protection to local manufacturers can be granted.   In 1978 the listed goods 
were butter, cabbages, cereal flour, rice vermicelli, rice bran, other brans, sharps and 
residues, mushrooms in airtight containers, natural yeast, ice, and sweetened forage.  This 
requirement was gradually removed in the 1980s4.  New additions into the schedule were 
also made comprising un-roasted coffee, milk, cream, and sterilized flavored milk.  By 2007, 
products that are still subjected to import license are round cabbages5, cereal flour, milk and 
cream, and sterilized flavored milk. Goods listed in the fourth schedule are beverages, milk 
and fish. Imported beverages such as whisky and brandy must be accompanied with 
certificate from the country of origin.  In addition, milk and milk products must obtain import 
permit from Malaysia’s Department of Veterinary Services of the Ministry of Agriculture.  
Imports of fish and plants should also obtain permits or phyto-sanitary certificates from 
various agencies.  Whisky and brandy imports have been listed in this schedule as early as 
1978.  In 1987, there was a significant review in the number of products that were listed.  By 
2004, many more tariff lines from the product groups comprising lacs, gums, and resins; 
sugar and sugar confectionary; preparations of vegetables, fruits, nuts, etc; miscellaneous 
edible preparations; and beverages, spirits and vinegar were added to the schedule. In 
addition, the halal requirement6 imposed on food imports particularly on the imports of meat, 
meat products and poultry in this schedule is perceived as non-transparent, confusing and 
relatively strict compared to other countries’7 (Warr et al, 2008). The nutritional labeling 
requirement for food imports is also viewed as a burden as the process of labeling according 
to specific conditions is labor intensive and costly8.                                                         
3 Padiberas Nasional Berhad (BERNAS) main activities involve the importation of rice, distribution of 
rice, investment holding, maintenance of the rice stockpile, distribution of paddy price subsidies to 
farmers on behalf of the government, management of the Bumiputera Rice Millers Scheme, and buyer 
of last resort at the Guaranteed Minimum Price of paddy (BERNAS, 2008). 
4 The requirement for butter was lifted in 1979. In 1980, rice vermicelli, natural yeast, ice, rice bran, 
other brans, sharps and other residues, and sweetened forage did not have to obtain import license 
anymore. Meanwhile, import license for mushrooms in airtight container was removed in 1984. 
5 Since 1986, import quota was imposed for the import of round cabbages. This was intended to 
protect local farmers in Cameron Highlands who cannot compete with the lower-priced cabbages 
imported from China. Nevertheless, the quota on import will be eliminated by 2010. 
6 Halal means permissible or lawful. The term is usually used in connection with halal meat which 
means meat that has been slaughtered in the manner prescribed by the shari’a 
7 According to Warr et al (2008), Australian exports have been badly affected by the ban in the use of 
mechanical or pneumatic stunning in the slaughtering of cattle. 
8 The nutrition labelling requirement was proposed in March 2003 which requires certain format for 
nutritional information to be labelled on the package for cereals, breads, milk, canned meat and fish, 
canned fruits, canned vegetables, fruit juices, soft drinks, and salad dressings. The U.S. food 
suppliers were in shortage of time to use up their existing stocks before complying with the new 
requirement. By 2005, import of more than 50 food products is to have nutrition contents on the 
labels. 
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3. DETERMINANTS OF NTBs 
 
Discussions on the determinants of trade protection usually revolve around the political and 
economic aspects of trade.  Studies in this realm have looked at the political and economic 
factors that influence the level of trade protection.  Nevertheless, these studies have mainly 
focused on the determinants of NTBs in the U.S’ manufacturing industries.  Such studies 
found seller concentration, seller number of firms, buyer concentration, buyer number of 
firms, scale economies, capital stock, comparative disadvantage position, and ad valorem 
transportation charges to be important determinants of NTBs (Trefler, 1993; Ray, 1981a and 
1981b; Clark and Bruce, 2006). Other studies found that certain industries are more inclined 
to get protection from imports in the form of NTBs.  In the U.S., these industries are those 
that manufacture tobacco, paper, leather products and primary metal.  According to Metcalfe 
and Goodwin (1999) industries that are geographically concentrated, provide lower skilled 
employment and wages, have low export share and high extent of value added processing 
are usually more likely to receive protection.  In addition, Lee and Swagel (1997) discover 
that in 41 countries they analyzed, industries that are weak, declining, threatened by imports 
and large tend to get greater trade protection. 
 
Meanwhile, studies on developing countries including Malaysia are scarce due to the lack of 
data for NTBs.  To our knowledge, the only existing study on Malaysia is that of Lee (as 
cited in Amelung, 1989) who examined the determinants of effective and nominal rates of 
protection in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector.  In this study, Lee found that trade protection 
increases with a rise in firm concentration index and the number of employees.  For other 
developing countries such as South Africa and Mexico, Drope (2007) recently identified the 
size of industry, geographical dispersion, changes in output-import ratio and the steel 
industry to be important factors that shape trade policy. The continuous decline in average 
tariff rates and the corresponding increase in NTB protection may also suggest that both 
tariff and NTBs are associated.  According to Mansfield and Busch (1995), pre-existing tariff 
levels do influence society’s demand for additional protection and the willingness of officials 
to meet them.  Bhagwati (1988: 53) also coined the “law of constant protection” where 
another form of trade protection is apt to appear elsewhere if the existing one is reduced.  
This implies that tariff and NTBs can be substitutes.  However, evidence from several single-
country studies, one of which is Ray (1981b), suggests that both variables complement each 
other. 
 
4. THEORETICAL MODEL FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF NTBs 
 
Gawande and Krishna (2003: 214) recently surveyed several hypotheses pertaining to the 
determinants of trade policy.  Apparently, these hypotheses could be grouped into various 
models.  Among these models are the interest group model, the adding machine model, the 
status quo model, the social justice or equity model, the comparative cost model, and the 
foreign policy model. In the interest group model, industries that are adversely affected by 
imports would lobby governments for trade protection.  The model claims that an increase in 
employment and output growths, both favorable conditions in an industry would necessarily 
lead to lesser demand for protection.  On the other hand, increases in imports would lead to 
greater demand for protection to safeguard the potential real return to specific factors.  The 
adding machine model meanwhile looks at the number of employees in an industry to 
influence the level of NTB protection granted.  A large number of workers would maximize 
the government’s chance for re-election.  Thus, an increase in the number of workers entails 
an increase in trade protection provided to the industry concerned.In the status quo model, 
policy makers would be concerned about the effects of changes in trade policy to workers in 
an industry.  Thus, governments would try to minimize or delay the adjustment costs of                                                                                                                                                                             
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changes in trade protection level.  Current protection level is then associated with its past 
level.  The social justice model on the other hand hypothesizes the government to be 
committed to lowering income inequality and improving the standard of living of the poor.  As 
such, industries with large number of unskilled workers receiving low wages would receive 
greater protection level.   
 
Additionally, the comparative cost model predicts that industries facing high import 
penetration would need high import protection level.  In the foreign policy model, countries 
with investment interests in other countries would impose less trade barriers on imports from 
the host economies.  The outcomes of trade policy would also depend on the strength of a 
country’s bargaining power and involvement in trade negotiations. Based on these models, 
early estimation of factors that determine the level of trade protection or trade policy had 
taken a reduced form approach. Nevertheless, Grossman and Helpman (1994) have 
developed a model that is able to link existing empirical work and the underlying theory.  
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have simplified the Grossman-Helpman model.  In their version, 
NTB coverage ratio is used as the dependent variable to depict the trade protection level.  
The independent variables are comprised of import elasticity, import penetration ratio and 
whether or not the industry concerned is politically organized.  The model was also extended 
to include variables from the various models mentioned earlier to improve its fit. Goldberg 
and Maggi (1999) found that employment related regressors such as unemployment rates 
and employment size would improve the model.   
 
The model by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) is adopted in this study as the theoretical basis for 
the determinants of NTBs in Malaysia’s agricultural sector.  Data constraints however limit 
the exact model from being fully applied.  Instead, other regressors used previously by 
Trefler (1993), Ray (1981a, 1981b) and Lee and Swagel (1997) among several others are 
included in the NTB function.  For example, employment variable is included to examine the 
role of adding machine or interest group models in influencing the level of NTBs.  The 
sectoral share of value added as used by Lee and Swagel is also included in the function as 
proxy for the sector’s political importance.  In addition, labor productivity in the agricultural 
sector is chosen as proxy for sectoral competitiveness, a factor based on the interest group 
model.  Variables in the adding machine and interest group models are empirically tested in 
the present study as Amelung (1989) found these models to be relevant for developing 
economies.  Tariff function is also included in the NTB function to ascertain whether tariff 
and NTBs are substitutes or complements.  Meanwhile, the import elasticity variable is 
dropped from the function, as the reliability of its estimate is questionable9. Thus, the NTB 
function is formulated as follows: 
 
N = f (t, I, LP, VA, EG)                                                                                           (1)                                                     
                                  
where N is the NTB coverage ratio in the agricultural sector, t is the average tariff rate in the 
sector, I is agricultural import penetration ratio, LP is the agricultural sector’s labor 
productivity level, VA is the sectoral share of value added, and EG is the sector’s 
employment growth rate.  We expect all the regressors to be significantly related to NTBs.  
Tariff could exert a positive or negative effect on NTBs depending on whether these 
variables are substitutes or complements. Import penetration and political importance are 
expected to exert a positive effect on NTBs.  Sectoral competitiveness and employment 
growth should be negatively related to NTBs. 
 
                                                         
9 Holden and Casale (2002) also left out the import elasticity variable from the theoretical equation 
used in their estimation of the Grossman-Helpman model.  Moreover, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) 
mentioned that import elasticity estimates are ‘noisy’ data. 
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
The NTB function in the preceding section is then estimated in a log-linear form as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5log log log log logt t t t t t tN T I LP VA EG                                                              (2)                       
 
where Nt  is non-tariff barrier i.e. NTB coverage ratio in the agricultural sector at time t, Tt is 
agricultural sector’s average ad valorem tariff rate at time t, LPt is agricultural labor 
productivity at time t, VAt is agricultural sector’s share of value-added at time t, EGt  is 
employment growth10 in the sector at time t, and It  is import penetration ratio in the 
agricultural sector at time t. t  represents the residuals in the NTB function.  
 
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach (Pesaran and Pesaran, 
1997; Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001) is used to estimate the NTB function11.  Before we 
proceed with the estimation, the variables in equation (2) would be tested for the presence of 
unit root using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. A variable that has a 
unit root is non-stationary12 and regressions involving such time series would erroneously 
imply the presence of a meaningful causal economic relationship (Harris, 1995). The study 
uses annual data from 1978 to 2007.  Import penetration ratio is calculated as the ratio of 
import to domestic demand13. The annual tariff rate in the agricultural sector is derived by 
way of simple average ad valorem tariff measurement. Data for labor productivity is 
calculated as the ratio of value added to total employment in the sector. Data for value 
added and employment growth are the percentage share of value added and the percentage 
change of total employment in the agricultural sector respectively.  The aggregate level of 
NTBs in the sector is derived based on the compilation of NTBs over the thirty-year period 
and calculated using the NTB coverage ratio method of measurement14.                                                          
10 Employment growth is not transformed into logarithm due to the presence of negative growths in 
employment in several years. 
11   This technique is chosen as it has several advantages.  First, the technique does not require pre-
testing of the order of integration of the variables in the function.  It can be applied regardless of 
whether the explanatory variables are purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually co-integrated.  Second, the 
unrestricted error correction model associated with this technique provides better statistical properties 
as it does not push the short-run dynamics into the residual term (Tang, 2005). Third, unlike the 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration technique that is more suitable for large sample sizes typically 
involving 100 observations, the ARDL technique can accommodate cases where there is a small finite 
sample. 
12  A time series is considered non-stationary if the mean, variance and auto-covariance are not time 
invariant (Gujarati, 1995).  In other words, non-stationary time series have a different mean at 
different points in time and its variance and sample size are positively related. 
13 Domestic demand is calculated as agricultural production less agricultural exports plus agricultural 
import. 
14 This method is more feasible at this level of aggregation as we are only concerned with the overall 
level of protection in the agricultural sector.  Using any other method would require an extensive 
amount of data and information in calculating the protection level, which would be insurmountable 
given that there are thousands of tariff lines in the sector. The method requires information on the 
import weight of products affected by NTBs and a binary indicator that indicates the presence or 
absence of NTBs in the sector.  As in past studies, the ratio will be calculated by the following 
equation: 
1
l
j
i j
j jj
m
NTB n
m
 
 
 
 
 
          j = 1,2,…..,l      
 
where i represents the agricultural sector, j represents the disaggregated products in the sector, n is 
the binary indicator for the presence (n = 1) or absence (n = 0) of NTBs, and m refers to the value of 
gross imports of each disaggregated product.  As mentioned before, the record of imports subjected 
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6. FINDINGS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURAL NTBs 
 
Results from the unit root tests show that all the variables are I(1) except for import 
penetration ratio and employment growth as they are stationary at level. Thus, the use of the 
ARDL method of estimation is deemed appropriate due to the mixture of I(0) and I(1) series 
in the function. To estimate the long run relationship between NTBs and their determinants 
in the agricultural sector, equation (2) is modified to incorporate the long-run multipliers and 
short-run dynamic coefficients in a conditional vector equilibrium correction model such as 
below: 
 
1
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
1
log log log log log log log
p
t t t t t t t i t i
i
N c N T I LP VA EG N            

            
3 51 2 4
0 0 0 0 0
log log log log 8 9
q qq q q
j t j k t k l t l m t m r t r t t t
j k l m r
T I LP VA EG D D           
    
               
                        
(3) 
 
where c0 is the intercept or constant, εt are white noise errors and δt are the long run 
coefficients. D8t and D9t are included to represent dummy variables for the economic crisis 
periods in the 1980s i.e. 1985 and 1986 and in the 1990s i.e. 1998 and 1999.  As EG is not 
expressed in log due to the presence of negative values in the series, its estimated effect on 
NTBs is only obtained after the coefficient estimate is multiplied with its mean value.  
 
Results from the bounds test (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 2001) conducted 
at lag 1 (based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion) show that the F-statistic is 11.4642.  When 
compared with the critical values tabulated by Narayan (2004) for Case II (restricted 
intercept and no trend), the F-statistic obtained clearly exceeds the upper bound critical 
values at both 5 and 10 percent significant levels, which are 4.193 and 3.517 respectively. 
This means that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected.  As such, there is a 
long run relationship among variables in the model.  We then estimated this relationship and 
derived the following equation:  
 
logNt = -11.8243 + 0.4266logIt + 0.3205logTt + 1.3899logLPt + 0.0422logVAt  
   (-2.828)** (2.234)**        (2.482)**          (3.795)***         (0.135) 
 
+ 0.0272EGt – 0.4748D8t – 0.1416D9t                                  
    (2.674)**     (-2.471)**    (-0.719) 
(4) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics associated with the coefficients.  *** shows 
significance at 1 percent level and ** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  
 
In equation (4), import penetration ratio is significant and positive. Thus, an increase in 
imports by 1 percent is expected to generate as much as 0.4 percent increase in NTB 
protection level. Tariff is also positive and significant at 5 percent level. A 1 percent increase 
in the average tariff rate would induce an approximately 0.3 percent increase in NTBs in the 
agricultural sector. The coefficient of labor productivity in the model is also positive and 
significant. It shows that a 1 percent rise in sectoral competitiveness leads to a 1.4 percent 
rise in NTB level.  The political economy of trade protection theory postulates that an 
increase in the sector’s competitiveness should entail less protection.  Instead, the positive 
sign obtained indicates that more protection is granted to the agricultural sector.  Even                                                                                                                                                                             
to at least one type of NTBs in each year between 1978 and 2007 is obtained from the Royal 
Malaysian Customs. The value of each affected imports are obtained from the Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia. 
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though the sign of the coefficient is unexpected, it is plausible for the agricultural sector of a 
developing country such as Malaysia to have such result. In addition, a 1 percent increase in 
employment growth generates an increase of approximately 0.03 percent in NTBs15.  An 
improvement in employment growth signifies a growing industry, which should be expected 
to require less protection.  Thus, the result from the study is not consistent with the interest 
group model of the political economy of trade protection theory.  However, Clark and Bruce 
(2006) also found the variable to be positive in their study.  If the variable is considered as 
indicative of a growing employment size, then the positive outcome obtained is consistent 
with the adding machine model of the political economy of trade protection theory.  
 
The coefficient for the 1980s economic crisis dummy variable is significant, indicating that 
there is a change in the level of NTB coverage ratio during crisis and non-crisis time periods.  
The negative coefficient implies that the NTB coverage ratios decrease during the economic 
crisis period.  Since fewer goods are imported during economic crises, the NTB coverage 
ratios could decline due to the reduction in the value of imports incurred during such 
periods16. Meanwhile, the insignificance of the share of value added means that political 
importance of the sector is not important in determining the protection granted to the 
agricultural sector. While this variable is theoretically expected to be important, the sector’s 
declining contribution to the country’s value added may explain for the variable’s 
insignificance.  
 
The model is further estimated to determine the short-run determinants of NTBs. Based on 
the results from the error correction model, the short–run NTB function can be depicted as 
follows: 
 
logΔNt = 0.0742 – 0.2825logΔNt-1 + 0.5624logΔIt + 0.1956logΔTt +  
  (1.112)    (-1.541)                 (2.902)***          (1.451)         
 
0.1056logΔLPt – 0.2575logΔVAt + 0.0109ΔEGt – 0.2137D8t –  
   (0.098)               (-0.597)                 (1.263)           (-1.438)         
 
0.1839D9t – 0.5104ECTt-1                                      
          (-1.161)      (-2.005)*         
         (5) 
Diagnostics: 
Adjusted R2 0.3454   
AR(2) 2.6409 [0.1021] RESET(2) 2.4653 [0.1166] 
Heteroscedasticity(1) 1.0787 [0.4231] Normality(2) 12.5188 [0.0019] 
 
Note: ( ) parentheses denote the t-statistics while p-values are in [ ] parentheses.  Breusch-
Godfrey, White, Ramsey RESET and Jarque Bera tests are used to test for the presence of 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, model mis-specification and residual non-normality in 
all models. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
respectively. 
 
Among the potential determinants of NTBs, import penetration ratio is the only significant 
factor which influences NTBs in the short run.  NTBs are inelastic with respect to import 
penetration ratio with a magnitude of 0.6 percent for every 1 percent change in the latter.                                                          
15  To obtain the effect of employment growth on NTBs, the coefficient estimate for the variable in 
Model 3 is multiplied with the mean value of employment growth i.e. 0.9766, given that employment 
growth is not specified in log. 
16  Recall that NTB coverage ratios are derived based on the value of imports that are subjected to 
NTBs.  
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The sign of the variable reflects that an increase in import penetration ratio leads to an 
increase in NTB protection in the short run.  Other variables such as tariff, labor productivity 
and employment growth, which are statistically significant in the long run, are insignificant in 
the short run.  The negative and significant lagged coefficient of the error correction term 
(ECMt-1) in the model reflects that the adjustment of NTBs to shocks in the system is quite 
rapid as 51 percent of the disequilibrium is adjusted to achieve convergence in the long run. 
The model adequately explains the relationship among the economic variables as it passes 
all the diagnostic tests except for the normality test.  Even though the null hypothesis of 
residual normality is rejected, the coefficient estimates are not affected as the non-normality 
is caused by excess kurtosis17.  According to Paruolo (as cited in MacDonald and Ricci, 
2003), in instances where normality is rejected due to excess kurtosis, the results from the 
regression are not affected.  Thus, the model does not exhibit any autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity and model misspecification problems.  The fit of the model is also 
satisfactory, showing that roughly 35 percent of the variations in NTBs are explained by the 
variations in the independent variables.   
  
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis of NTBs in Malaysia’s agricultural sector reveals that numerous non-tariff measures 
have been imposed on agricultural imports since the 1970s. These imports are subjected to 
non-tariff measures for reasons such as the protection of health, sanitary, security, 
environment and intellectual property.  Nonetheless, some agricultural imports are also 
imposed with NTBs to protect domestic producers from import competition.  Over the years, 
more and more agricultural imports have been imposed with some form of non-tariff 
measure.  Thus, given the apparent rise in NTBs, the paper seeks to identify the incidence 
of NTBs and examines factors that influence the level of NTBs in the agricultural sector. 
Factors such as import penetration ratio, sectoral competitiveness level, employment growth 
and tariff are found to be important in influencing the long run level of NTBs in the sector.   
 
From the findings, we conclude that any foreseeable “threat” on domestic agriculture from 
increased imports would herald an increase in the level of protection granted to the sector.  
Additionally, an increase in the sectoral average tariff rate would signal the impending rise in 
NTBs since both tariff and NTBs in the agricultural sector are complements.  We also 
deduce that the importance of agriculture to the country’s rural population may induce the 
government to increase its protection of the industry over the long run.  Removing trade 
protection would create uncertainty as to whether or not workers in the sector can adjust to 
the changes.  Thus, the concern about lowering income inequality and improving the 
standard of living of the poor may explain why protection is increased even when 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector improves.  Food security, which relates to the 
availability of food in Malaysia and one’s access to it, is another possible reason for the 
increase in NTB protection.  Protecting the livelihood of workers in the sector by imposing 
import control will also bring more political mileage to the incumbent government. As 
workers in a particular sector are the electorates that will maximize the government’s 
potential for re-election, this would give the incumbent government an incentive to protect 
the sector as the number of employees rises. The current relatively low tariff environment 
signals that further trade liberalization process would now involve the reduction or removal of 
NTBs.  As such, the agricultural sector can no longer rely on NTBs for protection against 
import competition.  Programs that allow domestic agricultural producers to successfully 
adjust to changes in the market condition and those that will not leave them marginalized in 
the trade liberalization process must be implemented beforehand. Ultimately, a cautious and                                                         
17  The residual has a skewness of 0.8 and a kurtosis of 5.8. Individually, all the variables at level pass 
the Jarque Bera test of normality. The p-values for the Jarque Bera statistics for N, I, T, LP, VA and 
EG are 0.29, 0.24, 0.22, 0.61, 0.35 and 0.22 respectively. 
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gradual approach to trade liberalization is necessary for a developing country such as 
Malaysia. 
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